Doty Joe and Fenlason Jeff Narcissism and Toxic Leadership Military Review 2013
Summary: The U.s.a. volition spend $687 billion on the Usa military machine, narrowly defined. Broadly defined, we spend almost a trillion dollars. But information technology repeatedly fails to defeat our poorly trained and equipped foes. Don Vandergriff (Major, US Army, retired), one of our top experts in war machine reform, points to one cause: how the Army selects and promotes its officers.
The United states of america Army has a leadership problem.
By Donald Vandergriff (Major, US Army, retired).
The US military has a leadership problem. It's visible in the deterioration of soldiers' confidence in the leaders, shown by the 2014 Military Times survey asking 2,300 active-duty soldiers about their lives. In that location is much more evidence. An article in the January-Feb 2013 Military Review made waves: "Narcissism and Toxic Leaders" past Joe Doty (Lt. Colonel, United states Army, Retired) and Jeff Fenlason (Master Sergeant, U.s.a. Army). And "Pentagon investigations point to military organization that promotes calumniating leaders" (WaPo, Jan 2014). Too see these two posts about the recent scandals in the officeholder corps: looking at the scandals and asking why so many.
The problem is growing worse. There is a lot happening in the Regular army's civilisation below the visible surface.
A diagnosis of the problem
I take been writing since 1999 that the Army – all the services – has an antiquated personnel system, the deep crusade of their many disparate bug.
Our military uses processes bred in the historic period of Frederick Taylor and adopted after WWII (circa 1947). Designed to repeat WWII, our military leaders built a force capable of rapid large-calibration mobilization. Information technology is wide in experiences but shallow in professionalism. To run it they created an officeholder corps of industrial-age managers. Leadership was non required. This is the opposite of what the leaders of Germany'southward Army did in the 19th century after their defeat by Napoleon.
Since then, these processes accept become institutionalized. Today nobody in Human Resources Command or G1 (Personnel) knows the origin or purpose of their methods. Information technology is merely the way they run.
The Regular army spends much effort cheering about their greatness. If the Regular army was so skilful, its deportment would speak then loudly as to make boasts unnecessary. Simply our failed wars since 9/xi bear witness a different Army than the one our leaders see in the mirror.
Our military machine leaders believe they are great and and so take no need to change. They hear their boasts echoed by the news media. They are dazzled by the money they deploy – in 2018, 35% of the world's military spending (nearly of the rest is spent by our allies). Our perceived superiority has become our greatest obstacle to success. Also bad our foes are unimpressed, and win from Vietnam to Afghanistan and Iraq.
The 4 pillars of our Army
Today's Ground forces culture rests on four pillars. All over lx years old. All residuum on out of date assumptions about managing homo talent.
1. A giant officer corps.
A heavier than necessary officer corps leaves junior officers piffling time to gain experience leading troops. The average time as a platoon leader is six – 12 months. Command assignments are 12 – 15 months (ii in 24 months, if one is so lucky). Combined artillery teams are very complicated. Such short terms are mad, commanding only long enough to gain some competence only as they exit. The Army has likewise many officers rotating through the limited number of control openings.
The Number of Officers per 100 enlisted personnel: 1901-2013.
For more almost this, meet Our army's bloat of officers is one reason information technology can't win wars.
2. A top-heavy officer corps.
George C. Marshall knew that we were lucky in WWII. We had allies to fight Axis leaders who made stupid strategic decisions – decisions that bought united states of america the fourth dimension we need to prepare (there were only 17 thousand Marines in 1935). Rather than relying on luck for the next state of war, subsequently WWII the Ground forces'southward leaders (Marshall, Ike, Bradley, etc) said we needed a larger than necessary officer corps, especially at the superlative, for mobilization confronting the Soviet Marriage or China or both. Next time nosotros might non have years to expand.
The result is an Army built to keep all these officers busy. Such every bit redundant HQs that produce vast amounts of often-petty information up the chain of command while generating lilliputian tasks for subordinates to keep staffs and senior leaders busy.
Nosotros get an army that cannot defeat our actual foes, who are little more militia led past small numbers of lightly trained officers. For more near this problem, see …
- Exercise nosotros demand so many and such well-paid generals and admirals? — by Richard A Pawloski (Captain, USMC, retired).
- The price of too many generals: paying more to get a less effective military – by Ben Freeman (Project on Government Oversight).
three. An officer evaluation organisation built for businesses.
We have a check-the-box evaluation arrangement (state-of-the-art in 1947) built on an as flawed one. In 1936, the US Ground forces attaché to Germany unfavorably compared the United states of america Regular army's evaluation systems to theirs. Germany based theirs on essays in which superior officers evaluated their subordinates' characters – peculiarly the willingness and ability to seek and accept responsibleness and moral courage.
Why practise U.s. officers not exercise this? The Army believes most officers cannot write cogently and that such evaluations would be besides subjective. And so we accept 20 captains in a brigade evaluated by 1 Colonel – based on his observations, expressed in checking ane of four blocks. Words are meaningless; just the block counts.
4. A centralized selection and promotion system.
The Defense Science Board's 2010 Summertime Report on Enhancing Adaptability of U.S. Military Forces stated that the Armed Services's personnel organisation was the biggest obstacle to adaptability. While nigh major corporations (and the most successful armies in history) had decentralized boards and promotions approaches, the U.s. has stuck with an out of engagement Industrial Historic period personnel management system.
Members of promotion boards evaluate stacks of papers, spending 30 seconds on each. Using these, they select and promote people who are most like them. Due to the big number of officers, anything simply a perfect evaluation tin can side-track an officer'due south career.
In the High german Regular army at its summit, officers regarded perfect files with suspicion. Leaders with strength of character volition inevitably acrimony people when doing the right thing.
The Germans also relied on examinations that combined essays and problem-solving exercises. Our Army doesn't practise then because it reduces senior officers' discretionary ability to promote people, much like the patronage-based government bureaucracies in the late 1800s – earlier the reforms that created the modern (and far more than effective) civil service systems.
See the side by side postal service, in which Don discusses what the Army's doing to reform itself, and the more powerful steps it could take.
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Editor's afterword
Martin van Creveld explains one foundation for the High german ground forces's superiority in WWII in Fighting Power: German language and Usa Army Performance, 1939-45. 
"Seeckt {Chief of the German regular army} did reform the Evaluation Forms by which superiors of every rank judged their subordinates and which constituted the main instrument for selection; in 1920 these were redrafted to put an even heavier emphasis on character, that is honesty, selflessness, readiness to commit oneself, and a sense of responsibility. Careerism was frowned upon, whereas the ability to generate and maintain trust was counted as the single nigh important virtue. …commanding officers were warned that they would exist judged …by the quality of their reports.
"The form known as Beurteilung (cess, estimate) had to be filled in every two years. …Evaluating officers were asked to estimate their subordinates grapheme, personality, behavior under fire, professional competence and accomplishments, physical condition, and fettle for other positions, in that order. Neither point systems nor forced comparisons were employed, thus forgoing objective standards and putting dandy organized religion in commanders' power (and willingness) to differentiate between the fit and unfit.
"The Beurteilung was to provide "a plastic clarification of the whole human."
This was the reverse of the US military'due south arrangement of industrial direction, which treats people like widgets. Information technology produced a forcefulness that conquered much of Europe despite its inferiority in all material aspects.
About Donald Vandergriff
Donald Vandergriff retired in 2005 at the rank of Major after 24 years of active duty as an enlisted Marine and Army officer. He now works as a consultant to the Army and corporations. Don is 1 of America'southward foremost experts on means to reform the war machine's personnel systems. GI Wilson (Colonel, USMC, retired) gives the bottom line to Don'due south career.
"Vandergriff battles to improve DoD's leadership and determination making. He challenges its senior leadership to bring meaningful modify and accountability to DOD. Like others with his experience, he sees that DOD's senior leadership (both uniforms and suits) today appears most concerned with their perks and the revolving door opportunities created past boosting profits for defense force contractors. They lack the moral courage to serve the people they pb.
"Vandergriff offers creative and rational personnel and leadership solutions that raise national security. He gives top priority to DoD's people, ideas, operational creativity, and lastly hardware. Without more than people similar him in the Pentagon, our national security will continue to be at great peril."
Posts by Don, providing valuable insights about our mad wars and cleaved Army. See all of his posts.
- Well-nigh the importance of charisma for leaders.
- About armed services leaders in the 21st century: "Theirs Is to Reason Why"
- Transitional islamic state of afghanistan war logs: Shattering the illusion of a anemic victory.
- Dragging American Military Culture into the 21st Century.
- Leadership in activeness: when resources constraints meet conspicuous consumption, nosotros just ignore the problem.
- Reforming the United states Army: can exist done, must be done.
Posts about Don'due south work.
- 4GW: A solution of the third kind – Vandergriff is ane of the few implementing real solutions.
- Why Vandergriff's piece of work is a vital contribution to preparing America for 21st-century warfare
- Don Vandergriff strikes sparks that might assistance reforge the U.s. Regular army.
- Obama tin accept a bold step to begin reform of the DoD & so end our series of defeats at 4GW – James Fallows proposes putting a reformer – Don – in a primal part at DoD.
- A step to getting an constructive military. Nosotros might it need soon. – Why nosotros need to listen to Don.
Hither are two excerpts from Manning the Time to come Legions of the United States: Finding and Developing Tomorrow'south Centurions.
- Preface – understanding the problem is the key to finding solutions..
- Training of officers, a primal step for the forging of an effective military machine strength.
For a description of his work and links to his publications see The Essential 4GW reading listing: Donald Vandergriff. For an example of his contributions, see this about his Adaptive Leaders Course. Most importantly, see his books at the terminate of this post.
For More Information
Important – For another perspective on why our military no longer wins wars, see Careerism and Psychopathy in the Usa Armed forces leadership by GI Wilson (Colonel, USMC, retired).
Ideas! For shopping ideas see my recommended books and films at Amazon.
If you liked this post, like us on Facebook and follow us on Twitter. See all posts about our generals, almost our officer corps, about means to reform the military, and especially these most our officer corps …
- The Cadre Competence of America's Military Leaders. – It's non what most people expect.
- The moral courage of our senior generals, or their lack of it.
- Generals read "Ender's Game" and see their vision of the future Marine Corps – by a sergeant in the USMC.
- How many generals would Lincoln have fired to win in Iraq & Transitional islamic state of afghanistan?
- Rolling Rock releases Colonel Davis' blockbuster report virtually Afghanistan – and our senior generals!
- Exercise nosotros demand and then many and such well-paid generals and admirals? — by Richard A Pawloski (Captain, USMC, retired).
- The toll of too many generals: paying more to get a less effective military – by Ben Freeman (Project on Authorities Oversight).
- William Lind looks at our generals, sees "rank incompetence".
- Trump chooses another general all-time suited to lose wars. – past William Lind.
- Careerism and Psychopathy in the US Military leadership — by GI Wilson (Colonel, USMC, retired).
Vandergriff shows that we tin reform the The states military
These books by Donald Vandergriff (Major, US Army, retired) explicate how we can do it. It won't be like shooting fish in a barrel.
He takes this work to the side by side level in his new volume, Adopting Mission Control: Developing Leaders for a Superior Command Culture
"In September 2010, James G. Pierce, a retired U.S. Regular army colonel with the Strategic Studies Found at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, published a study on Ground forces organizational culture. Pierce postulated that "the ability of a professional arrangement to develop future leaders in a fashion that perpetuates readiness to cope with future environmental and internal uncertainty depends on organizational culture." He found that today'south U.S. Ground forces leadership "may be inadequately prepared to atomic number 82 the profession toward future success."
"The demand to prepare for future success dovetails with the utilize of the concepts of mission command. This book offers upwardly a set of recommendations, based on those mission command concepts, for adopting a superior command culture through educational activity and training. Donald Due east. Vandergriff believes past implementing these recommendations across the Ground forces, that other necessary and long-awaited reforms volition take place."
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Source: https://fabiusmaximus.com/2019/06/29/leadership-problem-of-us-army/
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